Operation VERTIGO

[Nentsia]

Nyköping, Nyland

Niklas Westerberg, director of the Federal Security Department's Section IV/D, charged with the operations against domestic terrorism, presided over a joint meeting with the Cabinet and the heads of Section V/E, responsible for the surveillance of sabotage and political extremism in Nyland. The reason for the meeting was plain and simple: a recent politically motivated hate crime, resulting in the deaths of 16 civilians, committed by NMP sympathizers. The attack had taken place in the context of recent rapid radicalization of the NMP, with increasing political activism, looking to stretch the limits of the law, and the use of inflammatory rhetoric and hate speech against minority groups.

The recent attack, classified as a terrorist attack by the Nylander authorities, had been the direct reason for the FSD to seek presidential approval to launch an intensive intelligence operation against the NMP and affiliated groups, an unprecendented step as the NMP was elected to the nation's legislature. Total secrecy was of utter importance to avoid potentially enormous political scandals. The FSD had as task to investigate any and all individuals and groups who, through their activities or goals, give rise to the suspicion they pose a serious threat against the constitutional order and the national security.

The operation that the FSD was setting up had to provide both strategic intelligence, current intelligence and tactical intelligence on the threat of NMP radicalism. The strategic intelligence had to support long-term policy towards the more general threat posed by radical right wing terrorism and political violence. The current intelligence had to provide both the FSD, the government and law enforcement bodies with an insight in the existing threat of the NMP. The tactical intelligence, if available, concerned the most difficult information to acquire. It was the sort of information that can be used to thwart a terrorist attack or disrupt a plot. It may seem illogical and contradictory, but tactical intelligence was not the main priority of the FSD. Discovering and thwarting terror plans is more often the result of incidentally picked up information, or of accidentally caught information in the process of looking for a bigger picture. But looking for that next big attack is as searching for a needle in a haystack, and unlikely to succeed in preventing it.

Nevertheless, the previous attack did justify the use of heavy intelligence tools. In fact, the FSD could use any legal means it had at its disposal to penetrate the NMP and its social networks. Operation Vertigo would be a joint operation of Sections IV and V. IV would lead the operation as a counter-terrorist operation, but Section V would supplement the team with its knowledge and experience in dealing with political extremism and the Nylander far-right.

Although both sections dealt with political violence of some sorts, they did differ from eachother. The Counter-terror unit was focused relatively on medium-short term operations, studying networks and radical groups and individuals with the sole purpose of figuring out whether they were planning to commit violence. If a suspicious target over an extended period showed no inclination towards using violence, his priority was downgraded and eventually surveillance would stop altogether. The Extremism section was the opposite: they mainly ran long-term operations to study the development of radical and extremist groups, not necessarily looking for signs of violence, but simply keeping an eye on their activities, ideas, strength and followers. The Extremism section was more passive, conducting more traditional surveillance operations. The CT unit was pro-active, always looking for the next clue or hint of danger, and ready to sound the alarm and intervene. The Extremism section seldomly intervened in the world of their surveillance targets. If their targets would know they were being monitored by the FSD, it would only serve the confirm their conspiratory worldview and potentially further antagonize and radicalize them.

The FSD had been busy collecting all available police information on the NMP. Its rallies, activities and violations of the law had been carefully documented by local law enforcement, and these files formed a starting point. The two teenagers who committed the terrorist attack formed a second starting point, as the FSD would comb through all their confiscated computers, phones, contacts and communications to look for any possible links with other radicals.

First of all, the FSD wanted to know the strength of the NMP in numbers, and especially the strength of its active, fanatical core. Who belonged to it and with how many. Secondly, the FSD wanted to know their economic resources and access to weapons. Secondly, the FSD wanted to locate extremist networks that existed within and outside the NMP organization, the dangerous, underground cells that used, or abused, the NMP as a cover for a more sinister political agenda than either the authorities or NMP leadership was aware of. What networks existed within the NMP? And which networks or individuals had (hidden) ties to extreme right wing groups outside the NMP? The FSD was also interested in individual sympathizers of the NMP, who seemingly were not part of any dangerous network, but whose ideas, profile or internet behaviour betrayed them as potential lone wolves. With these questions, the FSD tried to map the NMP's most threatening elements and undertake action against them if the situation required it.

First of all, open sources would be used. FSD observation units would observe NMP rallies, suspicious members, study police files, and monitor social media communities and accounts. Then they would request banks to hand over whatever financial information they had on the NMP, its members suspected of extremist ties, the identities of donors, and what the money was spent on. HUMINT operations were to be set up - FSD and police moles would be used to attend NMP gatherings, become acquainted with NMP members and sympathizing groups, looking to gradually infiltrate the movement to help identify the potentially violent individuals and networks. The NMP leadership would also be under intense surveillance, to establish the degree to which they supported, rejected, condoned or encouraged violence. They would be under covert physical observation, their phones would be tapped, their financial affairs looked into, and their internet providers would be requested to provide lists with internet contacts they had.

Furthermore, the FSD would search its databases of intercepted internet and communication data from the air, for possible bits and pieces of communication between NMP persons of interest, while also drawing on existing intelligence on Nylander far-right networks and underground cells. Furthermore, the FSD considered employing agent provocateurs and honey-traps to lure extremists within the NMP towards it, but Westerberg believed this would have to be done as a separate operation. Another consideration was to place recording and tracking equipment in cars of leading and suspicious NMP adherents, and to place recording equipment used as safe homes by the most radical circles in the NMP who might only speak openly about their ideas and plans in their safe home-environment in presence of like-minded friends.

Such heavy methods were to be used later during the operation however. They would start by a massive effort to quickly identify the internet accounts and identities of the producers of extremist content and its consumers. The propagandist seldomly carries out the acts that he is calling for, but its their audience that the FSD was interested in. Operation Vertigo was set to take at least 6 months, but depending on its outcomes, might be extended to an entire year.