Eternity RPC Board
03-27-2017, 10:08 PM
Improving the 3-5-2
I've spent the past few days in Football Manager trying to perfect my preferred system of play; the 5-3-2, or 3-5-2. I wanted to try some ideas in practice, but I also wanted to improve my understanding of this specific system, and above all, combine it with the art of the Italian School. The laboratory to experiment with it was a saved game in which my Italian national team is facing Portugal in the quarter finals of Euro 2016.
One aspect of the Italian School that is so hard to implement/replicate in the game is called Fantasia in Italy. Fantasia is the tactical equivalent of individual brilliance, for which Brazilian, Dutch, and Spanish styles are known. The Italian equivalent is the ability of Italian teams, through collective effort, to break down the opponent's defense at an unexpected moment and score. It is this ability that has contributed to the reputation of the Italians as being ''cunning'', with sneaky strikers like Filippo Inzaghi that ''nick'' their goals, and ''outwit'' their opponents. Italian teams are often accused of winning through luck, especially since their goals may sometimes make their opponents look stupid. Part of it is perhaps an inherited reputation, but it is genuinely part of the Italian football culture to play with the mind as well, and not just their feet. Fantasia then, is to play patiently and to wait for a small opportunity to appear, and then to strike unexpectedly and with precision. In FM, there is of course no tactical instruction saying ''be cunning as a fox''. And in real life, I doubt it would work that way.
The System: 3-5-2
The system that I want to perfect, which is quite common within Italy, is the 3-5-2. With its three at the back and three central midfielders, it offers a lot of security in the central zones of the pitch, which are the most crucial zones to protect. The two men on the wings have to defend the flanks and provide width when the team is in ball posession. The two strikers play close to each other to receive direct passes from the back and to be able to support each other. This sounds pretty basic and easy, but in practice the 3-5-2 system is a matter of tactical precision work. I've seen in my own country, where they are not used to it, and in the English Premierleague as well, where teams experimenting with this system were completely destroyed. In the Dutch competition, several teams have occasionally switched to a defensive 5-3-2 against bigger opponents, only to concede even more goals than was expected. The Dutch national team in similar fashion began with a 3-5-2 against France in the World Cup Qualification, and in the first half they were 0-3 behind. In the second half the Dutch switched back to their usual 4-3-3 and got back to 2-3. During the first half, virtually all players were walking out of position, showing a clear lack of understanding of their required movements in a 3-5-2 system.
The difficulty lies in those six players in the central zone. It makes the team unbalanced and space is given away on the flanks. In order to defend effectively, the central midfield three have to cover a lot of distance from left to right. But they also need to intelligently try to disrupt the opponent higher up the pitch, because a large gap exists between the midfield and attack. At the same time, the midfield three have to be careful that, in pressing forward, they do not leave gaps between the midfield and defence, which makes the team vulnerable. So the midfielders require a lot of stamina and tactical intelligence to remain correctly positioned. Tactical intelligence is also a necessity for the defensive trio. It is their task to protect the central channels, provide extra cover to the lone man on the flank, and to ensure that they remain close enough to the midfielders in front of them. These movements can easily go wrong if a team is unfamiliar with the system, and it will lead to a crushing defeat.
Tactical Style
One of the key features of the 3-5-2, aside from defensive security in the central areas, is the tactical flexibility of the system. In the defensive fase it positions as a 5-3-2. When the flank is attacked, a wing-back confronts the attacker and the system gravitates (like a pendulum) into a situational 4-4-2. When the team has regained posession of the ball, the wing-backs push up and join the midfield to form a 3-5-2, creating a lot of passing options to build up the attack. In the attack fase, the midfielders link with the attackers, the attackers make runs into different directions, and the wing-backs become wide attackers. This enables the team to attack from different directions.
With the Italian idea of Fantasia in mind, the ability to suddenly unlock the opponent's defense through collective effort, I tried to maximize the flexibility - and therefore the unpredictability - of my playing style. If the team is capable to build the attack differently every time, attack from different angles, and take unexpected paths to the opposition goal, it becomes impossible for the opponent to predict my team's next move, and they cannot cut off my passing channels. The three central defenders at the back, with a central midfielder directing the game from behind the front lines, and the two men on the flanks, would give me almost unlimited options to build up the play. No matter where Portugal would press, my team could always take an alternative route forward. For that purpose Marchisio, Bonucci, and Pelle were key. If Portugal were to press high, Bonucci had the license (and the skills) to hit the ball long to Pelle, whose physical strength ensures that he can hold off his opponents for a while. So in case Portugal decided to press, my team could fly over it. Marchisio was the main director of the team, always making himself available to the defenders, and in charge of the decision to play it short to the other midfielders, medium-long to the wing-backs, or a direct vertical pass to the strikers. Everything depends on the vision of Marchisio, which makes it unpredictable. It depends on what the opponent does and the movements of my own players as to how Marchisio decides to build the play.
The players on the wings always have multiple options when they are pressured. They move the game quickly forward with a cross from deep, they can try a short pass to the nearest midfielder who roams into whatever space opens up, move the ball back to Marchisio, or slow the game down and pass it to the side defender. The strikers in their turn can opt to reach their attacking partner, opt for a short pass to the nearest midfielder, move it wide to the wing-back, or move it back to Marchisio waiting in a safer area. In every fase of the play, the team can change the direction and speed of its game, and there is no fixed pattern or attacking plan behind it. These sudden changes of direction and rythm are the key to find opportunities and to unlock the opponent's defense.
Italy - Portugal
I tested the theory in a game against Portugal in the Euro 2016 quarter finals. The varied and collective build up worked, to my own surprise, remarkably well. The first half hour of the match was dominated by my team - but, admittedly, also because Portugal retreated into a bunker in a 4-1-4-1 formation with Christiano Ronaldo as a lone attacker (Basically the defensive variant of Blacaria-ball). In the first 30 minutes, Italy dominated ball-posession with 55%, had a pass completion rate of nearly 85%, and a tackling success rate of almost 80%. As my assistant manager said: we play brilliant football at times, but we have to start scoring goals. In the 32nd minute, completely unexpected, Gabbiadini ''nicked'' the opening goal for Italy. I've taken some screenshots to show how a seemingly non-threatening build-up variation no. 134 of Italy leads to an unexpected opening in the Portuguese bunker-defense.
After that glorious moment, in which I enjoyed one the rare occasions in FM that a tactical plan is perfectly executed, Portugal started to take the initiative in the game. In this knock-out fase of the tournament, they must score in order to avoid elimination. That is partly the reason why Italy generally does well in knock-out tournaments: they can score out of nothing, and then they can play their favorite game of withdrawing and waiting for the opponent to come forward, only to hit them again on the counter-attack. Portugal was really pushing my team back, but their attacks stranded every time on my stubborn, Italian defense. In the second half, Portugal continued to pressure my team, and they seldomly managed to have posession of the ball for long. The Jose Mourinho in me was awakening, and I instructed the team to be a little bit more opportunistic in ball posession: no more trying to patiently build up the play, no more variations or trying to surprise Portugal. The ball had to be hit forward, out of my own half, as quick as possible.
Parking an airplane
From about the 70th minute, I did not want to take any more risks to try and score that 2-0 on the break. Rather than parking the bus with two defensive lines, I went for parking an airplane with three defensive lines. The attackers were now asked to help out defending as well, while the rest of the players faked injuries, wasted time, and collapsed from the slightest physical contact with a Portuguese player. But in the 76th minute, they secured the victory. A free kick by Verratti landed before the feet of Mattia De Sciglio (brought on for Antonelli), and the Portuguese had completely left him unmarked. De Sciglio scored 2-0. But it would even get worse for the Portuguese. In the 88th minute, in what was almost exactly the same scenario, Alessio Romagnoli got a clear chance to head on goal and scored the 3-0.
Although the score-line does not reflect the match, it was deserved for Italy in the sense that Italy was simply more lethal in executing its game-plan. In the analysis it was revealed that Portugal, despite their pressure in the late first half and second half, failed to produce any scoring chances at all. Italy meanwhile, produced 4 ''half scoring chances''. Three goals out of 4 half chances means they played with clinical efficiency. And perhaps also a bit of luck. You never really know which it is with Italians.
Formation:
![[Image: ir1SFtJ.jpg]](http://i.imgur.com/ir1SFtJ.jpg)
I've spent the past few days in Football Manager trying to perfect my preferred system of play; the 5-3-2, or 3-5-2. I wanted to try some ideas in practice, but I also wanted to improve my understanding of this specific system, and above all, combine it with the art of the Italian School. The laboratory to experiment with it was a saved game in which my Italian national team is facing Portugal in the quarter finals of Euro 2016.
One aspect of the Italian School that is so hard to implement/replicate in the game is called Fantasia in Italy. Fantasia is the tactical equivalent of individual brilliance, for which Brazilian, Dutch, and Spanish styles are known. The Italian equivalent is the ability of Italian teams, through collective effort, to break down the opponent's defense at an unexpected moment and score. It is this ability that has contributed to the reputation of the Italians as being ''cunning'', with sneaky strikers like Filippo Inzaghi that ''nick'' their goals, and ''outwit'' their opponents. Italian teams are often accused of winning through luck, especially since their goals may sometimes make their opponents look stupid. Part of it is perhaps an inherited reputation, but it is genuinely part of the Italian football culture to play with the mind as well, and not just their feet. Fantasia then, is to play patiently and to wait for a small opportunity to appear, and then to strike unexpectedly and with precision. In FM, there is of course no tactical instruction saying ''be cunning as a fox''. And in real life, I doubt it would work that way.
The System: 3-5-2
The system that I want to perfect, which is quite common within Italy, is the 3-5-2. With its three at the back and three central midfielders, it offers a lot of security in the central zones of the pitch, which are the most crucial zones to protect. The two men on the wings have to defend the flanks and provide width when the team is in ball posession. The two strikers play close to each other to receive direct passes from the back and to be able to support each other. This sounds pretty basic and easy, but in practice the 3-5-2 system is a matter of tactical precision work. I've seen in my own country, where they are not used to it, and in the English Premierleague as well, where teams experimenting with this system were completely destroyed. In the Dutch competition, several teams have occasionally switched to a defensive 5-3-2 against bigger opponents, only to concede even more goals than was expected. The Dutch national team in similar fashion began with a 3-5-2 against France in the World Cup Qualification, and in the first half they were 0-3 behind. In the second half the Dutch switched back to their usual 4-3-3 and got back to 2-3. During the first half, virtually all players were walking out of position, showing a clear lack of understanding of their required movements in a 3-5-2 system.
The difficulty lies in those six players in the central zone. It makes the team unbalanced and space is given away on the flanks. In order to defend effectively, the central midfield three have to cover a lot of distance from left to right. But they also need to intelligently try to disrupt the opponent higher up the pitch, because a large gap exists between the midfield and attack. At the same time, the midfield three have to be careful that, in pressing forward, they do not leave gaps between the midfield and defence, which makes the team vulnerable. So the midfielders require a lot of stamina and tactical intelligence to remain correctly positioned. Tactical intelligence is also a necessity for the defensive trio. It is their task to protect the central channels, provide extra cover to the lone man on the flank, and to ensure that they remain close enough to the midfielders in front of them. These movements can easily go wrong if a team is unfamiliar with the system, and it will lead to a crushing defeat.
Tactical Style
One of the key features of the 3-5-2, aside from defensive security in the central areas, is the tactical flexibility of the system. In the defensive fase it positions as a 5-3-2. When the flank is attacked, a wing-back confronts the attacker and the system gravitates (like a pendulum) into a situational 4-4-2. When the team has regained posession of the ball, the wing-backs push up and join the midfield to form a 3-5-2, creating a lot of passing options to build up the attack. In the attack fase, the midfielders link with the attackers, the attackers make runs into different directions, and the wing-backs become wide attackers. This enables the team to attack from different directions.
With the Italian idea of Fantasia in mind, the ability to suddenly unlock the opponent's defense through collective effort, I tried to maximize the flexibility - and therefore the unpredictability - of my playing style. If the team is capable to build the attack differently every time, attack from different angles, and take unexpected paths to the opposition goal, it becomes impossible for the opponent to predict my team's next move, and they cannot cut off my passing channels. The three central defenders at the back, with a central midfielder directing the game from behind the front lines, and the two men on the flanks, would give me almost unlimited options to build up the play. No matter where Portugal would press, my team could always take an alternative route forward. For that purpose Marchisio, Bonucci, and Pelle were key. If Portugal were to press high, Bonucci had the license (and the skills) to hit the ball long to Pelle, whose physical strength ensures that he can hold off his opponents for a while. So in case Portugal decided to press, my team could fly over it. Marchisio was the main director of the team, always making himself available to the defenders, and in charge of the decision to play it short to the other midfielders, medium-long to the wing-backs, or a direct vertical pass to the strikers. Everything depends on the vision of Marchisio, which makes it unpredictable. It depends on what the opponent does and the movements of my own players as to how Marchisio decides to build the play.
The players on the wings always have multiple options when they are pressured. They move the game quickly forward with a cross from deep, they can try a short pass to the nearest midfielder who roams into whatever space opens up, move the ball back to Marchisio, or slow the game down and pass it to the side defender. The strikers in their turn can opt to reach their attacking partner, opt for a short pass to the nearest midfielder, move it wide to the wing-back, or move it back to Marchisio waiting in a safer area. In every fase of the play, the team can change the direction and speed of its game, and there is no fixed pattern or attacking plan behind it. These sudden changes of direction and rythm are the key to find opportunities and to unlock the opponent's defense.
Italy - Portugal
I tested the theory in a game against Portugal in the Euro 2016 quarter finals. The varied and collective build up worked, to my own surprise, remarkably well. The first half hour of the match was dominated by my team - but, admittedly, also because Portugal retreated into a bunker in a 4-1-4-1 formation with Christiano Ronaldo as a lone attacker (Basically the defensive variant of Blacaria-ball). In the first 30 minutes, Italy dominated ball-posession with 55%, had a pass completion rate of nearly 85%, and a tackling success rate of almost 80%. As my assistant manager said: we play brilliant football at times, but we have to start scoring goals. In the 32nd minute, completely unexpected, Gabbiadini ''nicked'' the opening goal for Italy. I've taken some screenshots to show how a seemingly non-threatening build-up variation no. 134 of Italy leads to an unexpected opening in the Portuguese bunker-defense.
Bonucci sets the play:
![[Image: PKhpOCD.jpg]](http://i.imgur.com/PKhpOCD.jpg)
Darmian switches the play:
![[Image: 0x795FO.jpg]](http://i.imgur.com/0x795FO.jpg)
Gabbiadini finds space on the other flank:
![[Image: xzTK6Cs.jpg]](http://i.imgur.com/xzTK6Cs.jpg)
Gabbiadini scores:
![[Image: TIGAF8a.jpg]](http://i.imgur.com/TIGAF8a.jpg)
After that glorious moment, in which I enjoyed one the rare occasions in FM that a tactical plan is perfectly executed, Portugal started to take the initiative in the game. In this knock-out fase of the tournament, they must score in order to avoid elimination. That is partly the reason why Italy generally does well in knock-out tournaments: they can score out of nothing, and then they can play their favorite game of withdrawing and waiting for the opponent to come forward, only to hit them again on the counter-attack. Portugal was really pushing my team back, but their attacks stranded every time on my stubborn, Italian defense. In the second half, Portugal continued to pressure my team, and they seldomly managed to have posession of the ball for long. The Jose Mourinho in me was awakening, and I instructed the team to be a little bit more opportunistic in ball posession: no more trying to patiently build up the play, no more variations or trying to surprise Portugal. The ball had to be hit forward, out of my own half, as quick as possible.
Parking an airplane
From about the 70th minute, I did not want to take any more risks to try and score that 2-0 on the break. Rather than parking the bus with two defensive lines, I went for parking an airplane with three defensive lines. The attackers were now asked to help out defending as well, while the rest of the players faked injuries, wasted time, and collapsed from the slightest physical contact with a Portuguese player. But in the 76th minute, they secured the victory. A free kick by Verratti landed before the feet of Mattia De Sciglio (brought on for Antonelli), and the Portuguese had completely left him unmarked. De Sciglio scored 2-0. But it would even get worse for the Portuguese. In the 88th minute, in what was almost exactly the same scenario, Alessio Romagnoli got a clear chance to head on goal and scored the 3-0.
Although the score-line does not reflect the match, it was deserved for Italy in the sense that Italy was simply more lethal in executing its game-plan. In the analysis it was revealed that Portugal, despite their pressure in the late first half and second half, failed to produce any scoring chances at all. Italy meanwhile, produced 4 ''half scoring chances''. Three goals out of 4 half chances means they played with clinical efficiency. And perhaps also a bit of luck. You never really know which it is with Italians.
Media report:
![[Image: BxXS4Ft.png]](http://i.imgur.com/BxXS4Ft.png)
Match statistics:
![[Image: q1OIZwc.png]](http://i.imgur.com/q1OIZwc.png)